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| Registros recuperados: 12 | |
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| Caballero, Ricardo J.; Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.. |
| In most instances, the dynamic response of monetary and other policies to shocks is infrequent and lumpy. The same holds for the microeconomic response of some of the most important economic variables, such as investment, labor demand, and prices. We show that the standard practice of estimating the speed of adjustment of such variables with partial-adjustment ARMA procedures substantially overestimates this speed. For example, for the target federal funds rate, we find that the actual response to shocks is less than half as fast as the estimated response. For investment, labor demand and prices, the speed of adjustment inferred from aggregates of a small number of agents is likely to be close to instantaneous. While aggregating across microeconomic units... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Speed of adjustment; Discrete adjustment; Lumpy adjustment; Aggregation; Calvo model; ARMA process; Partial adjustment; Expected response time; Monetary policy; Investment; Labor demand; Sticky prices; Idiosyncratic shocks; Impulse response function; Wold representation; Time-to-build; Financial Economics; C22; C43; D2; E2; E5. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28419 |
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| Caballero, Ricardo J.; Cowan, Devin N.; Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Micco, Alejandro. |
| Microeconomic flexibility, by facilitating the process of creative-destruction, is at the core of economic growth in modern market economies. The main reason for why this process is not infinitely fast is the presence of adjustment costs, some of them technological, others institutional. Chief among the latter is labor market regulation. While few economists would object to such a view, its empirical support is rather weak. In this paper we revisit this hypothesis and find strong evidence for it. We use a new sectoral panel for 60 countries and a methodology suitable for such a panel. We find that job security regulation clearly hampers the creative-destruction process, especially in countries where regulations are likely to be enforced. Moving from the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Microeconomic rigidities; Creative-destruction; Job security regulation; Adjustment costs; Rule of law; Productivity growth; Labor and Human Capital; E24; J23; J63; J64; K00. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28486 |
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| Caballero, Ricardo J.; Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.. |
| What is the relation between infrequent price adjustment and the dynamic response of the aggregate price level to monetary shocks? The answer to this question ranges from a one-to-one link (Calvo, 1983) to no connection whatsoever (Caplin and Spulber, 1987). The purpose of this paper is to provide a unified framework to understand the mechanisms behind this wide range of results. In doing so, we propose new interpretations of key results in this area, which in turn suggest the kind of Ss model that is likely to generate substantial price rigidity. The first result we revisit is Caplin and Spulber's monetary neutrality model. We show that when price stickiness is measured in terms of the impulse response function, this result is not a consequence of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Demand and Price Analysis. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28423 |
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| Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander. |
| This paper reviews the Latin American experience with highway privatization during the last decade. Based on evidence from Argentina, Colombia and Chile, we find that private financing of new highways freed up fewer public resources than expected because public funds were often diverted to bail out franchise holders. Furthermore, many of the standard benefits of privatization did not materialize because of pervasive contract renegotiations. We argue that the disappointing performance of highway privatization in Latin America was due to two fundamental design flaws. First, countries followed a privatize now, regulate later approach. Second, most concessions were awarded as a fixed-term franchise, thereby creating a demand for guarantees and contract... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Build-operate-and-transfer (BOT); Concessions; Cost-of-funds; Flexibility; Franchising; Government subsidies; Present-value-of-revenue (PVR); Regulation; Renegotiation; Public Economics; H21; L51; L91. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28456 |
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| Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander. |
| Infrastructure concessions are frequently renegotiated after investments are sunk, resulting in better contractual terms for the franchise holders. This paper offers a political economy explanation for renegotiations that occur with no apparent holdup. We argue that they are used by political incumbents to anticipate infrastructure spending and thereby increase the probability of winning an upcoming election. Contract renegotiations allow administrations to replicate the effects of issuing debt. Yet debt issues are incorporated in the budget, must be approved by Congress and are therefore subject to the opposition's review. By contrast, under current accounting standards the obligations created by renegotiations circumvent the budgetary process in most... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Public Economics. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28382 |
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| Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander. |
| Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds. When PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a minimum revenue guarantee and a cap on the firm's revenues. Yet income guarantees and revenue sharing arrangements observed in practice differ fundamentally from those suggested by the optimal contract. The optimal contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with realistic informational requirements; and risk allocation under the optimal contract suggests that PPPs are closer to public provision than to privatization. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Financial Economics. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9280 |
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| Registros recuperados: 12 | |
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